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An interesting question forsociological analysis which has rarely been satisfactorily 
addressed is how future societies should be imagined. Perhaps the question of future 
societies has been seen as an un-sociological problem, since sociology, like all of social 
science, deals with the social world as it exists and how it came to be what it is. The 
future, however, is uncertain beyond what can be known on the basis of current trends. 
Thus, the dominant approach to the future in social science is predictive analysis.1 The 
limitations – as well as the advantages – of this mode of knowledge have been much 
discussed in the philosophy of social science and alternative epistemologies have been 
proposed that offer more critical and interpretative approaches to future possibility that 
are not based on probabilistic assessments of what might happen as a result of current 
risks. To these prognoses belong normative conceptions of the future, as in the notion of 
the post-national or cosmopolitan futures. However, as will be argued in this article, 
these approaches offer a limited view of the future, which requires a clearer perspective 
on social struggles and major social transformations in societal structures (see also Mota 
and Wagner, 2019).
It is now widely recognized that the future is not disconnected from the present but is 
a product of the present. At least within sociology, unlike normative political theory, such 
normative approaches to the future require an engagement with actuality. The capacity to 
imagine the future is part of the very fabric of human societies and resides in the capaci-
ties of social actors to interpret the social world. This has been widely recognized by a 
variety of very different philosophies of the imaginary.2 The capacity for thinking about 
the future may also have an evolutionary basis in human cognition.3 With modernity, the 
orientation to the future is all the more strong, as reflected in utopianism and radical 
political movements heralding a new age. Pre-modern societies were considerably more 
rooted in the past than modern societies, which sought to shape the present according to 
their vision of the future. Imagined futures are integral to the cultural models of modern 
society and are also central to the dynamics of capitalism. This is because of a fundamen-
tal shift in the perception of the future from certainty to uncertainty. The notion of the 
future as risk, for instance as in the writings of Ulrich Beck, introduced an interpretative 
dimension to the future in that risks require interpretation as they are not objective and 
real in ways that can be calculated by objective measurements (Beck, 1992).
However, social interpretation, as in the critical theory tradition, has a wider compass 
and includes learning capacities and re-interpretations of self-understanding. John Urry’s 
late work, What is the Future? (2016), while influenced by Beck, offers an additional 
perspective in that the future is radically unknowable and irreducible to risks. Societies 
are complex systems and the future is not just an extension of the present. Social futures 
are contested, varied and uncertain. Such systems are also fragile and characterized by 
innovation, unpredictability and possible reversal (Urry, 2016: 188).4 Complexity-driven 
futures is an alternative form of future thinking based on the individualistic model of 
human action, but it is also an alternative to conventional approaches based on the rela-
tively fixed and enduring economic and social structures that characterize the present.
The perception of the uncertainty of the future has also been a key factor in capitalist 
dynamics, making innovation possible for instance, as Beckert (2016) has shown (see 
also Beckert and Bronk, 2018). The seeds of the future are contained within the critical 
moments of present time. The future is thus both actuality and possibility; it is of the 
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present but also beckons beyond the present. The radical uncertainty of the future has 
opened it up to imaginary significations of all kinds. Many such projections of the future 
lack a normative orientation and also do not provide a satisfactory connection with actu-
ality, namely the world as it exists. This is to the detriment of a perspective on possibility. 
Such a perspective requires a strong focus on crises as the turning points of historical 
change, the points where the tracks of historical time can suddenly switch creating new 
historical paths. It may be suggested that the future is created in such moments of trans-
formation when radically new interpretations of the present take root. For this to be a 
valid perspective, it makes sense to talk about major social transformations only if this 
includes a transformation of societal structures, including structures of consciousness, 
and how to discern signs of something new.
In this article, I argue that a key sociological dimension of imagined futures is 
precisely such processes of structural transformation, which include normative, cog-
nitive, symbolic and aesthetic dimensions. It is therefore necessary to have a more 
thorough understanding of what it means to speak of a major social transformation. 
The specific question this article seeks to answer is the following: what are the major 
social transformations going on in contemporary society that will shape the future? 
This leads to a further question, namely what kind of social struggles underlie these 
transformations?
I begin with some further reflection on the category of the future as a basis for think-
ing about major social transformations. The article then offers an account of what I argue 
is the basis of a theory of social transformations, namely generative societal struggles in 
which new visions of the future are created. The third section discusses the three most 
salient social transformations of the present and how these play out in the current pan-
demic crisis.
When does the future begin?
The concept of the future, notwithstanding its imaginary and interpretative dimensions, 
is foremost a temporal category. Luhmann (1976) emphasized the future as a rupture 
from the present. The modern concept of the future entails a rupture from the past and 
becomes an ‘open future’. The future is experienced as a horizon of possibilities that 
disappear as we approach them. This immediately raises the time frame for thinking 
about the future. When does it begin? Has it already started? Is there no future? Assuming 
the present refers to the post-1945 period and extends to c 2050, a heuristic view of the 
future in temporal terms would see it as the world from the second half of this century, 
that is, from 2050. Why? There are two general sociological points to consider when 
looking at major societal transformation in a given time frame.
First, it is a question of rupture versus continuity. It is in part a question of how much 
weight we should give to rupture. Will the future be fundamentally different from the 
present or will there be considerable continuity? Second, if rupture is the critical matter, 
as I think it must be, it is also then a question of rupture from the past as well. In other 
words, the problem of rupture raises the question of whether the present (say, 2020) is 
fundamentally different from the past (say, from the pre-1945 period). So, the point of 
rupture has already happened, according the idea of the Anthropocene, as generally 
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understood as having commenced after the great caesura of 1945. If this is the case, then 
the future seen as unfolding over the next three decades to mid-century will probably 
not be much different from the present day.
A way to address the question is to say there are three possibilities or scenarios for 
looking at the future: transition, collapse/breakdown, and transformation.
The notion of transition suggests that the future will be structurally different from 
that which has gone before. One common way of thinking in such terms is the optimis-
tic scenario of a transition to a post-capitalist future, possibly enabled by new kinds of 
technology that will emancipate people from oppressive work and exploitation (Mason, 
2016). The vision of radical political ecology for a transformation in the relation 
between the social and the natural worlds also captures the utopian notion of a transi-
tion to a different and better world. The idea of the post-national has also been mostly 
cast in such terms of transition to a world in which the nation-state has vanished or is 
much diminished.
The second scenario for thinking about the future is the pessimistic vision of a col-
lapse of societal systems. There is clearly some basis for this: global warming probably 
will increase by 2 degrees in 30 years based on current trends (by end of the century 
maybe 4 degrees but probably not more). World population will increase from 7.6 billion 
to 9.8 billion. But it is doubtful that these trends in themselves, at least by mid-century, 
will lead to global catastrophe in the sense of planetary destruction. There have been 
many historical examples of societal collapse but they are non-global (see Diamond, 
2011; Tainter, 1988; Wallace-Wells, 2019).
The third scenario is what I claim is the more realistic likelihood of a transformation 
of current developments, but neither transition to a new kind of society nor the total col-
lapse of human societies. To imagine the future, we therefore need to pay closer attention 
to the nature and dynamics of current social transformations of societal structures.
However, the issue of temporality will not go away. We also need a longer time frame 
to consider seriously the future beyond the present. While I think our time is very differ-
ent from the modern era up till 1945, if we take the end of the Second World War as a 
watershed in the history of modern societies, then probably the next 30 years will not be 
much different from now, but things look very different if we take the end of the 21st 
century as our frame. In such a perspective, the old ways of viewing the future will be 
invalidated by planetary changes.
So, if we take a longer view of the future (to the end of the 21st century), I think it 
becomes clear that humans do not have a capacity to destroy the Earth, but they certainly 
have a capacity to make many societies unsustainable. It might be qualified that there is no 
one single future but multiple ones, which, if true, affirms the prognosis of transformation 
along different trajectories rather than transition or collapse. So, worst case scenarios are 
likely to be regionally specific. For now, much of Europe is probably not going to suffer the 
worst, but if we look further into the future the prospects are not good if global warming 
melts the polar ice caps and shuts down the Gulf Stream that is responsible for the temper-
ate climate in north-western Europe. In that scenario, which recalls Byron’s poem in 1816, 
‘Darkness’, Europe may witness not immigration but emigration for the first time since the 
early 20th century.5 Large parts of the world, already ravaged by mega fires and subject to 
devastating droughts, may become uninhabitable by the end of the century.
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The argument, then, is against the temptations of catastrophism and the naivety of too 
much optimism as things will continue more or less the same with some disruption for 
the future present. There are prospects for human agency to shape the world. So, my 
argument is one of optimism tinged with realism or put differently: pessimism with hope. 
This is where the notion of major social transformation becomes crucial to any consid-
eration of the future. It is firmly based on social agency and how the present time inter-
prets itself. Only by anchoring future possibility in the present is it possible to bridge the 
gap between actuality and potentiality. The future is in many ways a product of the pre-
sent (see Adams and Groves, 2007).
Contemporary sociological theory lacks a developed theory of social transformation, 
which indicates something greater than social change and having normative signifi-
cance. The concept is not unrelated to the older notion of revolution, but is not confined 
to the violent uprising of the masses, a notion that is less relevant to contemporary 
societies. Other conceptualizations are necessary. Roy Bhaskar’s ‘Transformational 
model of social activity’ is one famous conception of transformation that affirms the 
capacity of social actors to bring about the transformation of social reality (Bhaskar, 
1979). Social reality is made up of social structures, which are products of social action 
that have taken on the form of structures but can in turn be transformed by agency. But 
like many other accounts, Bhaskar’s it is very unclear on specific kinds of social trans-
formation. Habermas’s theory of communicative action is another approach that affirms 
the centrality of social action to bring about a transformation in the systemic structures 
of societies. As with Alain Touraine, his social theory asserted the centrality of social 
movements as the agents of societal transformation (Touraine, 1977, 1981). Touraine 
emphasized the place of cultural models in social movements in opening up alternative 
visions of social possibility. Habermas’s work put a strong emphasis on the normative 
and cognitive expansion of human reason in the confrontation with power. Honneth’s 
revision of critical theory is also in this vein of struggle against domination, but he sees 
struggles of recognition as the primary forms of social transformation (Honneth, 1996). 
The concept of social transformation has a reduced significance for Bourdieu, who was 
primarily concerned with the reproduction of forms of domination and the centraliza-
tion of state power.6 In Foucault, as in much of postmodern thought, social transforma-
tion is not a primary concern, given the concern with the analysis of power and 
scepticism about normative futures and collective struggles.
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a full assessment of the idea of social 
transformation in social theory, let alone an alternative theory. To undertake this task it 
would be necessary to revisit the classical sociological tradition constructed as a diagno-
sis of the times (from Weber to the Frankfurt School and beyond). This is not the place 
to do this. It can be commented that the idea of social transformation in this tradition on 
the whole was confined to a negative view of capitalist modernization that led to the loss 
of a progressive conception of the future as rooted in the potentialities of the present. The 
article seeks to offer an account of some of the elements of such a diagnosis of the times 
by looking at the dynamics of major social transformation and the related future imagi-
naries. Following a widely accepted approach in critical theory, social transformation is 
related to social struggles. Inspired by William Sewell’s theory of the French Revolution, 
I see it as also entailing a ‘transformation in structure’, as opposed to a more general 
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notion of social change.7 Structures of meanings and their transformation are, according 
to Sewell, strongly linked to symbolic and emotional experiences that lead to the creation 
of new structures of cultural frameworks. The next section provides an analysis of social 
struggles that are generative of major social transformations in that they open up new 
fields of possibility beyond the present.
Societal struggles and future imaginaries in contemporary 
societies
To begin, a double analytical distinction needs to be made on the basic elements of 
societal conflict in modern societies. The first is to distinguish the polarity of radical 
versus conservative (or affirmative) movements. While these are generally related to 
left and right, a broader and more generic distinction is needed, since, as is becoming 
increasingly clear, left and right no longer capture what is at stake in many political 
conflicts. The right (the neoliberal right and now the alt-right),8 for example, has 
increasingly become the main carrier of radical programmes and the left is often forced 
into more conservative positions. Ecological politics is a further complication of these 
lines, embodying both conservative and radical dimensions. As one would expect, many 
left and right movements embody both elements of the analytical distinction. For these 
reasons, the radical versus conservative distinction is more useful than left and right as 
generic terms to understand social transformations in societal structures. This is not 
suggest that the left has lost the capacity for radical programmes (the recent wave of 
anti-capitalist protests, Extinction Rebellion, and the Black Lives Matter movement 
[BLM] are testimony to the continued vitality of radical politics).
Second, a distinction needs to be made between social movements and political move-
ments. The latter are of a more specific nature and do not necessarily entail a wider 
transformation of society. The distinguishing feature of a social movement is that it con-
tains a vision of society that can be described as a cultural model which includes a social 
imaginary. The difference between both can be related to Karl Mannheim’s famous dis-
tinction between utopia and ideology (Mannheim, 1936). Social movements articulate 
the impulse towards utopia while political movements are more likely to be based on an 
ideology. The latter are more common but either can transform into the other. A political 
movement can become scaled up to a social movement (as for example the environmen-
tal movement) while a social movement may become institutionalized into a political 
movement (as, for example, becoming associated with a political party). The term ‘social 
movement’ is best confined to movements that are agents of major social transformations 
and irreducible to particular organizations. In spatial and temporal terms, social move-
ments are more expansive than political movements, which are confined to more specific 
issues, and entail an imaginary signification. In this article, I am mostly concerned with 
social movements, which can also be related more generally to the ‘great transforma-
tions’ of modernity. However, I do not think that many of the historical examples are 
helpful, since these are generally based on the idea of a transition from one type of soci-
ety to another, as in the Marxist historiography on the transition from feudalism to capi-
talism or, as mentioned, some notion of a revolutionary uprising that leads to a new 
social and political order.9 Following Touraine, modernity can be seen as shaped by a 
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dominant social movement; while specific movements have always changed, there has 
always been a dominant social movement that spear-headed societal transformation 
(Touraine, 1977). While Touraine clearly had radical progressive movements in mind, 
one also needs to consider affirmative or conservative ones.
On this basis, we can distinguish four key social struggles that have shaped contem-
porary societies since the post-1945 period. I see these less as political cleavages than 
social struggles that encompass the elements previously discussed and are generative of 
structural change, including structures of consciousness. They do, however, embody 
much of the form of a cleavage in that they have a pronounced political form that is 
related to a social division. However, these societal struggles are not easily reduced to 
forms of social stratification that map on to electoral blocs, as in the classic definition of 
a political cleavage in political science (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Indeed, many politi-
cal movements also do not map onto the classic lines of a political cleavage; such cleav-
ages traditionally concern mass support for the major political parties but do not entail 
fundamental societal transformation. In recent years political scientists have drawn 
attention to changes in the old political cleavages in Western societies as a result of glo-
balization. Most notably Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) have documented a clear shift away 
from the old left versus right cleavage as a range of new issues, most notably immigra-
tion, have come to dominate the political agenda (see also Bornschier, 2018). However, 
with a view to a perspective on major social transformation and future imaginaries, I 
argue that a broader perspective is needed. This is especially so in view of the fact that 
the new conflicts go beyond the model of a political cleavage. To this end, I argue for a 
framework that incorporates what I see as four central social struggles that have shaped 
most Western societies in the post-1945 period and which are likely to extend into the 
near future. The analysis is based on the historical experience of ‘Western’ societies, but 
I do not see this as ethnocentric in that the struggles discussed here can have different 
temporalities. Indeed, I would like to claim the four struggles are not sequential.
The first, on which we need not dwell too long, is the now familiar conflict between 
labour and capital, which derived from the historical struggles of the 19th century. In this 
conflict, which shaped the main political cleavage in many societies for much of the 20th 
century, the social question generated the dominant imaginary of a future society based on 
social justice. The main protagonists were what can now be called the old left versus the 
right, which we can also now term old conservatism. Since the late 1970s, the dominance 
of this conflict has dwindled both as a political movement and especially as a social move-
ment, due to the displacement of the social basis of the old left as a result of post-industri-
alization and the emergence of a new field of political contestation. However, the liberal 
script on which old conservatism sustained itself also underwent change, leading to a more 
complicated range of positions on the right. For a time, the imaginary of liberal democracy 
offered an alternative imaginary to that of the old left. The revolutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe in 1989/90 at first gave substance to the myth of the ‘end of history’, until 
the dream turned into a nightmare. In any case, we have with the first fissure, a fundamen-
tal conflict between left and right around two different imaginaries: social justice versus 
liberal democracy. The former nurtured egalitarianism while the latter fostered individual-
ism. These imaginaries have not vanished – the struggle for social justice is still very much 
alive – but they have entered into new domains and with very different scripts.
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The second societal conflict took shape with the rise of new social movements in the 
1970s. By the 1980s these movements, at least within Western societies, had a significant 
impact on the old left and on society more generally (see, for example, Dalton and 
Kuechler, 1990; Johnson and Klandermaans, 1995). Thus began the conflict between the 
new left versus the new right. The old left, with its focus on the social question (class and 
equality), was challenged by a range of new and more cultural questions that were pre-
dominantly a product as well as a generator of cultural pluralism. Women and the middle 
class figured more strongly in these new movements, which were also concerned with the 
quality of life, identity and post-material values (Inglehart, 1977). At the core of the new 
left was the imaginary of personal and collective autonomy. Cultural questions replaced 
or – as in the debate around recognition and distribution reveals – at least considerably 
complicated the older social questions around class (see Fraser and Honneth, 2004). On 
the other side of the political spectrum was the new right that emerged with the emergence 
of neoliberalism and new technocratic elites.10 This was of course a continuation of old 
conservatism, but in ways that often blurred the distinction between right and left, as in 
Third Way-style politicians of the left, such as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, who accepted 
much of the cultural politics of the new left. However, the new right, as reflected in main-
stream neoliberalism, was initially more allied to the traditional right in economic and 
social politics. The new right itself was pulled in different directions: the reactionary neo-
conservative right (as represented by Thatcher and Reagan) and its more socially liberal 
embodiments (for example, the CDU in Germany), to which we can add its progressive 
representatives (in cultural issues), as in Third Way politics. The new right, in all its mani-
festations, was united by the imaginary of the market and the vision of a new global age 
based on technocratic politics and the expanding horizon of the market.
It thus came about that, by the 1990s, the relatively sharp conflict between radicals 
and conservatives was diluted leading to different expressions of radical and conserva-
tive politics. Two kinds of radicals clashed, for the new right was itself a radical move-
ment, even when defending traditional values: neoliberal elites and technocratic elites 
versus the new elites the emerged with the new left. Many neoliberals took on board the 
politics of cultural pluralism, including human rights, while much of the new left was not 
primarily driven by the old class politics but by what Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) 
described as a cultural critique of capitalism. In this new conflict, in which feminism, 
human rights and environmentalism took central stage, the unity of the left was lost and 
a space was created for the gestation of neo-nationalism, for the two sides shared a basic 
belief in the prospects of globalization to deliver a better world but without having to 
address the problem of equality.
From the late 1990s, it became clear that a third societal conflict was emerging, add-
ing to the now complicated internal transformation of left and right. This can be charac-
terized as the conflict between cosmopolitanism and neo-nationalism. This emerging 
discord did not become pivotal until after the 2008 financial crash, but over the preced-
ing ten years or so it was in gestation. Indeed, since the 1990s, with the rise and expan-
sion of electronic communication and global communications and trade, the discord 
could easily be seen within the previously described conflict of the new left and new 
right in that cosmopolitans were clearly products of the new left in their politics and in 
their milieus, which were compatible with cultural pluralism and post-materialism. 
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Cosmopolitanism embraced the imaginary of individual and collective autonomy, which 
was part of the promise of a more globally connected world, which can be said to be a 
new global imaginary (Stegers, 2008). Nationalism, on the other side of the coin, was not 
a potent force in the 1990s, with the obvious exception of the Balkans, and could be seen, 
for the greater part, in terms of the affirmative politics of the more neo-conservative ele-
ments of the new right. The barbarism of the war in Bosnia and Kosovo provoked a call 
for a more cosmopolitan world that otherwise seemed to be viable in the mid-1990s.
This narrative has to be revised in light of the events that have followed in the wake of 
the financial crisis of 2008, when a nativist reaction occurred against cosmopolitanism as 
well as the so-called establishment, which includes both the right and left. The conflict 
between cosmopolitanism and nationalism cannot be seen within the contours of the new 
right and new left. It is now increasingly clear that cosmopolitanism is not only a politics 
of the new left but is also very attractive to the progressive elements within new right. 
Nationalism, too, cuts across both left and right, as the examples of Brexit and Trump 
show. Although primarily a right-wing political movement, Brexit gained considerable 
support from working-class voters who previously supported the left. In light of the rise 
of neo-authoritarianism – Bolsonaro in Brazil, Trump, Brexit, Modi in India, Erdogan in 
Turkey, Orban in Hungary – nationalism cannot be seen as incidental but a major counter-
vailing current in many parts of the world. While recent literature often contrasts (right-
wing) radical populism with liberal democracy, this leads to the mistaken view that the 
former is the contrary to democracy when in fact it has mostly been produced by demo-
cratic systems. In my view, it is best contrasted to cosmopolitanism, not least since this is 
the main rival of right-wing populism, which, in contrast, defends and defines itself as the 
protector of the nation against the dangers of the global world and the cosmopolitan elites.
Since 2016, with the election of Trump and the Brexit referendum in the UK, there has 
been a near total re-alignment of the right around neo-authoritarian nationalism (see also 
Brown, 2019). In the analysis offered here, this brings to the fore a different struggle 
from that of the new left and the new right since it rejects the imaginary of a global world 
and the politics of autonomy other than a limited notion of rights. Many elements within 
the progressive new right are in opposition to the current surge of neo-authoritarianism 
within liberal democracies, but do not otherwise share the imaginary of the new left. 
Consequently they reconcile themselves, if not ally themselves, with the neo-authoritar-
ian right. As argued, the remnants of the old left, in many cases, have also embraced 
nationalism, to their detriment as in the case of the hapless British Labour Party under the 
leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. Indeed, neo-authoritarian nationalism has become a radi-
cal force in the world, even as its claims to be affirmative of the nation. Now, while it 
could be argued the rise of neo-nationalism/authoritarian nationalism (Trump, Johnson, 
etc.) reflects the collapse of both the right and the left, the former has for the greater part 
re-aligned itself in a way the latter has not (an exception is the phenomenon of Bolsonaro 
in Brazil where both the left and right imploded).
While cosmopolitanism, when it became a potent force in the world from the mid-
1990s, offered a clear vision of bright future, neo-authoritarian nationalism has no such 
vision. Today, cosmopolitanism, in its older guise at least, has lost its zeal and capacity 
to bring about major social transformation. There are some signs that neo-authoritarian 
nationalism, with the support of the alt-right, Putin and radical libertarians,11 is instead 
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becoming a global force, though the nature of this alliance is such that it lacks a capacity 
to articulate a global imaginary. However, there is another way to look at the situation.
It is now becoming clear that we can speak of a fourth societal conflict and in which 
cosmopolitanism regained may have a new life and capacity to articulate a future imagi-
nary. Climate politics is now emerging as a major political force, but so is resistance to 
it. It is possible to see signs of a new societal conflict emerging around climate politics 
with, on one side of the spectrum, what can be characterized as eco-politics, to refer to 
progressive climate politics, of the Anthropocene, and, on the other, a re-aligned neo-
right, supported by the forces of unsustainability, including climate change denial, and 
the alt-right. Climate politics today has gone beyond the concerns of environmentalism 
in that it is not ancillary to mainstream politics but is now increasingly becoming one of 
the central challenges of politics in the era of the Anthropocene and attracting consider-
able public support since the Paris Agreement signed in 2016 (see Latour, 2017). 
Contemporary eco-politics is thus no longer confined to the limits of an oppositional 
political movement. Although environmental movements which operate on the level of 
political movements are major agents of political contestation, there are some signs of 
eco-politics taking on the character of a social movement in that what is at stake is 
increasingly seen to be the sustainability of human society itself. Since the Paris 
Agreement there is now a global climate regime that demonstrates a degree of reflexivity 
as well as universality (Dryzek and Pickering, 2019: 40).
One of the main expressions of eco-politics is calls for policies of sustainability, 
though in many accounts sustainability is inadequate as a response to the current scale of 
environmental destruction, since it is often simply the attempt to sustain what has come 
to be unsustainable. Eco-politics can in part be seen as an expression of cosmopolitan-
ism, but goes beyond it in bringing to the forefront of the political a new and different 
imaginary that cannot be seen only in terms of an appeal to the global world against the 
closed horizons of the nation. It is rather one that seeks to create a sustainable relation of 
the social world to the Earth. Neither the national community nor the global community 
offer a solution to the problems that can be associated with the Anthropocene. Eco-
politics seeks instead another and more far-reaching goal: to re-orient the relation of the 
social world to the planetary scale of the Earth. In doing so, it meets the resistance of 
what we can call the neo-right, which includes the neoliberal right and the reactionary 
neo-conservative right for whom eco-politics is a challenge to the status quo in ways that 
go far beyond all other radical movements. In this respect, a re-alignment of the right can 
be seen in the alliance of climate change denial, neo-authoritarianism and neoliberalism, 
as reflected in the supporters of the Trump presidency. For this reason, the central soci-
etal conflict today is not cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, but the Earth-based eco-
politics and the politics of unsustainability of the neo-right.
The foregoing reconstruction of the most consequential societal struggles of recent 
times in the West aims to identify the most important forces of social transformation in 
the Western world today and which are likely to shape the future beyond the next thirty 
years. I have argued that these are more than political cleavages; while having much of 
the character of social and political cleavages, they are of a wider nature and are genera-
tive of social transformation in that they bring about a fundamental transformation in 
the political and cultural structures of society leading to durable change. In this sense, 
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one can see the formation of a social movement and a normative vision of the future. 
The four societal struggles discussed, while being chronological in terms of their emer-
gence in Western societies, are overlapping in that they act upon each other and, as a 
result, undergo mutual transformation. They are also not necessarily successive in that 
in much of the non-Western world these struggles unfolded through different trajecto-
ries (Mota and Wagner, 2019). In this way, radical and affirmative movements have 
undergone internal transformation, as the history of left and right attests. Thus, for 
example, the BLM movement has now, with the Covid-19 crisis, emerged as a poten-
tially major movement that brings to the fore human rights and social justice. Finally, it 
is to be noted that all these conflicts are products of social interpretation in which col-
lective learning plays a role in determining how people respond to the objective situa-
tion. The mechanisms and processes by which this occurs go beyond the imaginaries of 
the movements in question.
In the ruins of the post-national domain: divided societies 
and the end of times
Until now, the notion of the post-national has been predominantly conceived in terms of 
the relationship of the global world to the local, including the national space. Globalization 
has allegedly undermined the integrative capacities of national societies and diminished 
the nation-state as the source of sovereignty. From the perspective of the present day, this 
picture of the post-national is in need of considerable revision, less for its accuracy than 
for the implications that might follow for the future. The national domain has not been 
superseded, even if it has been diminished by global forces. The worldwide response to 
the Covid-19 pandemic shows that the state has a powerful capacity to shut down whole 
societies. The example of China and the Belt and Road initiative shows a potentially new 
state-driven globalization. But it is evident that while there are now new spaces between 
and beyond national societies, the post-national does not reside in some non-national 
domain. The national domain still exists, even if it is in ruins, as one of the main contain-
ers of social institutions and much of the world is still organized around nation-states. Yet 
nation-states have lost their capacity to secure both social and systemic integration. 
National societies are now more divided than ever before. In this situation, which is due 
less to the failure of the nation-state than the failure of globalization to deliver a better 
world, cosmopolitanism on its own does not offer a solution. Indeed, it may be part of the 
problem in that cosmopolitanism has generally failed to adequately address two of the 
most urgent problems of the present day: the social question and the ecological question.
The previous reconstruction of societal conflicts points in the direction of contempo-
rary societies as deeply divided, with common ground increasingly eroded if not entirely 
abandoned. The condition of crisis, fragmentation and contestation is probably more 
significant than the spectre of globalization as the reality of the post-national today. 
While the older conflict between left and right was largely contained within the horizons 
of nation-state, the latter three societal conflicts discussed are not constrained by national 
limitations but are forced to operate within the national space only without the prospect 
of the common good as a normative bond. Many societies are now more internally 
divided than externally divided. In other words, the differences within national societies 
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has become greater than the differences between national societies. The social conflicts 
discussed in the previous section increasingly question national parameters and extend 
the field of political contestation beyond national borders. This leads to reactions that 
affirm the national but in ways that intensify its disintegration. Nowhere is this process 
of fragmentation more clear than in the case of the new forms of authoritarian or radical 
right nationalism that have surfaced in many countries. In these cases nationalism has 
rebounded but without a nation. As a result of far-reaching cultural pluralization and 
social diversification, on the one side, and on the other growing social inequality and 
social discontent deriving from globalization, the national domain has lost its integrative 
powers. This comes at a time when the nation-state is also losing it capacity to provide 
systemic integration. The foundations upon which it was based, for example progressive 
taxation, life-long employment, liberal migration policies, no longer exist. This comes at 
a time when the desire for safety has a new urgency. As the Covid-19 crisis reveals, the 
state is forced to re-discover its primary function to protect the health of its population.
In this situation, social struggles open up the Pandora’s box of the national domain 
to all kinds of movements, not all of which have any real capacity to clear a path to the 
future. One is the historical lineage of current visions and discourses of the end of times, 
which now includes the spectre of ecological catastrophe and pandemic infectious dis-
eases. With the declining capacity of the ideas of modernity – progress, liberalism and 
socialism, etc. – the future is opened up to new and dark visions. The imagination of the 
future is more likely to be dystopian than utopian. Slavoj Žižek, in Living in the End of 
Times (2011) has identified the four signs of this coming apocalypse: the worldwide 
ecological crisis; imbalances within the economic system; the biogenetic revolution; 
and exploding social divisions and ruptures. An example of a sinister and dark vision of 
the future is in the writings of the British philosopher Nick Land on acceleration and the 
‘dark Enlightenment’ replacing the progressive Enlightenment.12 It is clear that there is 
now a huge cultural production of dystopian visions that take popular as well as intel-
lectual forms (see Button, 2012; Horn, 2018; Killen and Libovic, 2014; Meiner and 
Veel, 2012; Recuber, 2016). It is easier to imagine the end of something than the crea-
tion of something new. This creates a space for fantasy. Perhaps a major factor in the 
current anxiety about the future is in fact uncertainty. The Covid-19 pandemic gives 
further animus to such anxieties, as Žižek (2020) has also commented in a recent book. 
This leads less to a vision of doom than numbness. It anesthetizes us. It inculcates a 
sense of powerlessness and hopelessness. It also creates a kind of fear that leads to anxi-
ety rather than to action. This is the psychological condition of chronophobia and the 
related phenomenon of climate anxiety.13 The sense of slow time – a distant future – 
reinforces the feeling that it is not of the present.
It can lead to bizarre responses, such as anti-natalism, a view that there should be no 
more human beings, even the right not to be born.14 It also leads to conspiracy theories, 
such as deep-state conspiracies, and other popular post-truth epistemologies, such as flat 
Earth theories.15 An additional feature of ‘end of times’ thinking is a tendency in radical 
right-wing Christian populism in the USA to embrace extreme versions ecological catas-
trophe, in which destruction is a punishment for those who have not resisted the tempta-
tions of liberal modernity (see Ronan, 2017; Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). In such visions, 
the nation is not a universal category in which something like a common good transcends 
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the good and the bad. The idea of the nation as a common space has in effect been aban-
doned by large swathes of the radical right for whom there is no common future, just 
survival. This vision is common to the alt-right and the soothsayers of the Dark 
Enlightenment. In the USA today, for many of the more extreme evangelical followers of 
Trump, there is a strong sense of a demonic rage against liberal values. Older and also 
religious themes play out in a cultural battle between different social milieus and their 
worldviews. Essentially, there a closed vision and an open one, a conflict that is illus-
trated by the phenomena of Trump and Brexit, to take the two most virulent develop-
ments that encapsulate more general societal trends. Covid-19 intensifies these trends.
There are two colliding worldviews which play out around different ecological visions 
and visions of political community. Cultural conflict today is very much between a liberal 
worldview – the open horizon of a pluralist and cosmopolitan one – and the closed world-
view of right-wing populism. This conflict is now also being played out through the prism 
of environmental catastrophe coupled with the pandemic health crisis. Issues of ecologi-
cal sustainability are at the core of this. The liberal left embrace the cause of sustainability 
to preserve the status quo. In this respect, they also side with the neoliberal middle ground, 
who also support cultural pluralism. On the other side of what is now a major societal 
division, large swathes of the population reject the open vision of both the left and middle 
ground, and the need to rescue a common future. The politics of sustainability and health 
are indeed drawn into this vortex. I think this is the only way it is possible to explain popu-
lar post-truth epistemologies such as climate change denial, conspiracy theories and flat 
Earth theories in the USA, anti-vaccine movements, where such trends are more 
entrenched. In every sense, the future is now; it is not a time yet to come; and it is not for 
everyone. The post-national is now embroiled in the end-of-times thinking.
A qualification should be noted. While I think one can speak of two cultures colliding 
with each other, a more differentiated view of the social groups in question and, too, a 
clearer sense of the related social milieus is required. If we look at the support basis for 
Trump in the US and for Brexit in the UK, what we see is the intersection of diverse 
groups, not one homogeneous group. There is a wider sociological point here, namely 
that cultural orientations do not translate directly into social groups or personality types. 
So, for example, in the UK, Brexit has been supported by diverse groups, mainly the 
southern English lower middle class and the northern working class. Trump’s support 
basis consists of more heterogeneous elements, ranging from the racist voter, the climate 
change denier, the evangelical voter who is satisfied by ultra-right-wing Supreme Court 
appointments, the National Rifle Association, the skilled working class hoping to get 
jobs back, the middle class seeking tax breaks, the traditional republican voter opposed 
to anything that resembles social democracy such as public health care, etc. It all ulti-
mately depends on the stay-at-home voter and voter suppression. This is a volatile situa-
tion and one with many contradictions, and it is not necessarily held together by the 
end-of-time scenarios or the politics of rage and fury. These cultural orientations, includ-
ing trends in popular culture and science fiction, both express and at the same time rein-
force societal polarization.
Such currents also take the form of cultural militancy. The appeal of Brexit, for many, 
is precisely the desire to embrace catastrophe and pain (see O’Toole, 2018). If the worst 
can’t be prevented, it can be embraced. This idea lies at the core of the Dark Enlightenment 
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which shares much with the alt-right movement. The very idea of catastrophe has entered 
into the Zeitgeist. This is not just a characteristic of the right but also of the far left: the 
idea that the march of socialism requires catastrophe before the promised land is reached. 
Hence the appeal of Brexit to the far left. However, there is no doubt that today it is the 
right that has embraced radical revolution, which is nurtured by social discontent. But let 
us not forget that the neo-right movement, in combating the new global climate regime, 
is led by opportunistic neoliberals for whom catastrophe presents a new order of govern-
ance, emergency governance, which may soon be complemented with climate emergen-
cies.16 The Amazon, the oceans, the polar caps, the glaciers of the Himalayas, and 
endangered species have been abandoned by global elites, who, unlike elites of earlier 
times, are not interested in the future.
For those with no hope for the future, the vision of a sustainable world has nothing to 
offer them. Their lives will continue to suffer from unsustainable systems (in health care, 
urban infrastructure, pensions, etc.). So better deny these to those who may benefit from 
them. Just consider San Francisco, an exemplary city for urban sustainable policies and 
cosmopolitan pluralism but with extreme social exclusion and homelessness. The 
Grenfell Tower fire in London in 2017 also reveals this discord at the centre of global 
cities. Sustainability and unsustainability coexist in a world characterized by extreme 
and growing social inequality.
This is what produces the social resentment that expresses itself in demonized forms 
and which lends support to a wider culture of authoritarianism, which has swept into 
many parts of the world, both in the northern and southern hemispheres. If anything 
unites the radical right it is authoritarianism in its cultural forms (and which is compati-
ble with opposition to political authoritarianism). Thus, anti-lockdown protests, espe-
cially in the USA, by the radical right go hand in hand with opposition to China in the 
name of freedom from tyranny (where essentially the state presents tyranny). However, 
from a sociological perspective, what is always crucial is not one specific cultural orien-
tation but the combination of different elements and orientations. Much of the current 
discussion on Brexit, Trump and related events and movements in other countries – 
Bolsonaro, a Brazilian version of Trump – focuses on populism. Some of this literature 
offers important perspectives on what are undoubtedly right-wing populist movements, 
which, while differing greatly have much in common (for example, anti-elite/anti-estab-
lishment, anti-migration, nationalistic and xenophobic, etc.). Clearly, Trumpism and 
Brexit are highly complicated phenomena and can be better explained by recourse to 
several causes coming together, rather than by reference to cultural narratives alone. 
Nonetheless, the subversion of the liberal script and the abandonment of belief in the 
nation and planet as a shared place is a clear and distinct marker of current times where 
the post-national is anything but cosmopolitan.
Major social transformations
The declining prospects of cosmopolitanism in face of the obvious rise of anti-cosmopol-
itan trends and the objective reality of climate change in the new context of the 
Anthropocene requires a fundamental revision of the political legacy of modernity. The 
natural environment can no longer be ignored or seen as a marginal to other conceptions 
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of the political. The concerns of older social struggles now need to be filtered through the 
prism of the Anthropocene, which is no longer a geological term but a key category of 
societal interpretation. The social question concerning equality is not one that can be 
posed without taking into account issues of sustainability. The politics of the old left as 
well as those of the new left have to face the challenges of eco-politics. Questions of 
social equality are inseparable from the sustainability of natural resources. The presup-
positions of some of the older social struggles need to be questioned in light of the 
Anthropocene, which reveals the contradiction between the belief in the infinity of 
growth and the finite resources of the Earth to sustain growth. The problem of social 
justice, for instance, cannot be solved satisfactorily in Western countries if it requires 
continued unsustainable growth that produces social injustice in other parts of the world 
that are locked into the global system of production and consumption. These contradic-
tions lie at the core of social struggles today. Another major contradiction that has become 
more important today lies in the technological foundations of society. New kinds of 
electronic technology have created the conditions for considerable human emancipation, 
but they have also created new kinds of domination. Individual and collective autonomy 
is both enhanced and underpinned by digital technology which enables political com-
munity to emerge, but also makes possible new kinds of technocratic power that go 
beyond anything previously imagined.
The following proposal places contradictions at the centre of the analysis of major 
social transformations. It is possible to identify three major contradictions at the core of 
contemporary society: capitalism and democracy; technocratic power and political com-
munity; growth and sustainability. Until recently, modern societies achieved a balance in 
these countervailing forces that provided modernity with its most basic animus. Today 
the capacity for contemporary societies to strike a balance between these forces is weak-
ened, and as a result, the scale of problems and societal crises increases to a point that the 
sustainability of society is now in question. However, despite the temptations of cata-
strophism, this situation creates new spaces for social struggles and opens up avenues for 
major social transformation to occur. A necessarily brief characterization of these new 
openings of the post-national domain can be given.
Capitalism and democracy. The relation between both has been one of tension in that 
they are based on different and opposing logics: inequality and equality; the market and 
political community. The ‘Great Transformation’, as described by Polanyi, once it had 
taken place led, through a ‘double movement’, to demands for social protection against 
the expansion of the market (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]). Class conflict in Western societies 
since 1945 has in general been towards an accommodation of both. Capitalism has had 
to be constrained to meet the demands of democratization; while democracy has had to 
make compromises. The resulting balance, leading to what has been referred to as demo-
cratic capitalism, has been fraught with problems of legitimation (Habermas, 1975). To 
sum up a complicated story, this balance between capitalism and democracy has now 
broken down to a point that it does not seem possible to restore it through the mecha-
nisms of class compromise and liberal democracy (Azmanova, 2020; Streeck, 2014). 
The decoupling of capitalism and democracy opens the ground for a different relation-
ship, which can be one that asserts the ascendency of one over the other. This is now one 
of the most important social transformations of the present. In the non-Western world, 
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the relation takes an even more intensified form in view of the fact democratic capitalism 
was already largely absent. This is strikingly the case in China, where human rights and 
democracy are severely curtailed by a societal model that unfetters capitalism from the 
restraints of democracy.
Technocratic power and political community. One of the features of modernity was 
the strong assertion of individual and collective autonomy as the basis of political com-
munity. While the main conflict that this led to was with capitalism, it is evident that, in 
recent times, as recognized by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, technology has 
become a new source of domination (Feenberg, 1991). This cannot be entirely explained 
by reference to capitalism, even if some of the major sources of technocratic power are 
capitalistic corporations. Digital domination in the new era of algorithmic governance 
and ‘surveillance capitalism’ is now a major challenge to democracy and to personal 
autonomy (Berns and Rouvroy, 2013; Bridle, 2018; Zuboff, 2019). On the other side, the 
pursuit of autonomy cannot, without regression, return to an earlier age when technology 
was not in itself a major source of domination. Progress in many spheres of life – in 
health and medicine, communications, the production of food – has been possible 
because of technology. Technology is no longer only a means to achieve ends, but in 
becoming an end in itself it has led to the creation of dependencies that are not guided by 
normative goals. This contradiction between technology as a means and as an end is not 
easily resolved, but could be said to be the basis of one of the major social transforma-
tions of the present. This question of technological mastery – the mastery of technology 
for normative goals – constitutes one of the major social transformations of the present 
and is closely related to the previously discussed relation of democracy and capitalism, 
but it is also central to the ecological challenge.
Growth and sustainability. The notion of the Anthropocene reveals a further 
dimension to social transformation. Until now, the natural environment was seen as 
lying outside the social world, which, in the formation of modernity, had emancipated 
itself from nature. Whatever balance was achieved between the social world and the 
natural world has now broken down. The latter no longer constitutes the stable ground 
on which human societies can exist. The destruction of the natural environment by 
modern societies, above all since the Great Acceleration17 in the post-1945 period, has 
led to a new situation in which the social and the natural have become de-coupled to 
the detriment of both. The older struggles operated on the assumption of a relation to 
nature that is no longer valid. The new struggles between eco-politics and the neo-
right take place on this ground, the new post-national space of the Anthropocene. The 
latter seek to maintain the status quo through measures such as emergency and disas-
ter governance, geo-engineering, the advocacy of resilience, securitization. Whether 
or not eco-politics will succeed in opening up a different path remains to be seen, but 
this struggle has already become a major social transformations of the present. The 
current Covid-19 pandemic makes this struggle all the more critical in that it intensi-
fies existing struggles and crises: the need for growth versus the need for social pro-
tection; liberty versus safety; the contradiction between the belief in the infinity of 
growth and the finite resources of the Earth to sustain it. It is however clear that the 
politics of sustainability must now include a relation to health. The pandemic has 
shown that the propensity created by turbo-driven capitalism not only to destroy the 
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natural environment but in doing so to create new risks – the global release of cata-
strophic viruses – endangers humanity at precisely the moment when humanity is 
already destroying the environment.
Conclusion
The post-national domain does not reside in global society or some kind of global 
order above and beyond national societies, but takes shape in the ruins of nations and 
in the social struggles that emerge in the interstices. A tendency in much of the litera-
ture on cosmopolitanism is to see it as a reality and that, by virtue of necessity, it will 
lead to a more cosmopolitan future. The premise of widespread cosmopolitanism does 
not lead to a more cosmopolitan societies. The reverse can happen, as is evident from 
many developments today in societies that, until recently, were regarded as cosmopoli-
tan, for example, the USA and the UK. Any account of cosmopolitan trends will need 
to consider anti-cosmopolitanism. A feature of the current situation is that the post-
national domain is a zone of contestation between, among other struggles, cosmopoli-
tan and anti-cosmopolitan struggles. In the account offered here, I have stressed the 
re-alignment of the right around neo-authoritarian nationalism, a narrow conception of 
rights, and climate change denial. Cosmopolitan trends will continue but are likely to 
be frustrated by other forces. In this account, then, the post-national domain is not 
necessarily cosmopolitan. However, the anti-cosmopolitan forces are unable to resus-
citate the nation, which has now become the site of a politics of closure. The Covid-19 
pandemic confirms this trend.
Yet, there is no total system of domination. Capitalism and the rise of new kinds of 
technocratic power do not obliterate alternatives. The major social transformations of the 
present are not singular paths or predetermined but involve significant struggles, the 
outcomes of which will shape the future. The argument offered in this article places more 
emphasis on a normative conception of a cosmopolitan future that identifies links 
between the social and the ecological as well as widening the notion of justice to include 
a broader sphere of issues than those that have traditionally been the concern of the left. 
The current pandemic brings many of these currents together. It is after all an example of 
a global force – there is nothing more potentially global and destructive than a virus – 
that is currently met by largely national responses (see Horton, 2020, for an incisive 
critique). One of the key questions for the future will be the prospect of a more cosmo-
politan response, the intimations of which might be seen in the intersection of three 
struggles that animate the present moment: the public health and medical crisis, the eco-
logical crisis and, as reflected in the BLM movement, social justice.
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Notes
 1. A classic account is de Jouvenel’s The Art of Conjecture, first published in 1964 (de Jouvenel, 
2017 [1964/1967]).
 2. On the notion of the radical imaginary, see Castoriadis (1987 [1975]) and more generally on 
the idea of social imaginaries Taylor (2004). See Adams et al. (2017) for a discussion.
 3. See Matthew Rushworth and Franz-Xaver Neubert’s research, https://www.livescience.
com/42897-unique-human-brain-region-found.html, reported in early 2014.
 4. In chapter 6, Urry outlined six methods of future research that follow from his perspective on 
complexity: learning from the past, studying ‘failed’ futures, developing dystopias, envisag-
ing utopias, extrapolation and scenario-building (see also Urry, 2013).
 5. Bryon’s poem ‘Darkness’ (1816) was a response to the eruption of Mount Tamborra in 
Indonesia the previous year, and an unusually cold summer in Europe and darkness caused by 
the ash.
 6. On Bourdieu as a theorist of social transformation, see Fowler (2020).
 7. See the chapter ‘Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at 
the Bastille’ in Sewell (2005: 225).
 8. The term designating the alternative right. See Hawley (2016).
 9. See for example, Trouillot (2003) on the global transformations that shaped the modern 
world.
10. O’Mahony (2014) characterized this as a conflict between radical pluralism and techno- 
conservatism.
11. For example, the support of figures such as Julian Assange for the Alt-Right. See also Snyder 
(2018).
12. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DarkEnlightenment. See also https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/may/11/accelerationism-how-a-fringe-philosophy-predicted-the-future-we-
live-in
13. See: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/feb/10/overwhelming-and-terrifying- 
impact-of-climate-crisis-on-mental-health
14. See, for example: https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-49298720 and https://www.
nationalreview.com/2019/05/anti-natalism-argument-david-benatar-wrong/
15. See for example https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/may/27/is-the-earth-pancake-flat- 
among-the-flat-earthers-conspiracy-theories-fake-news
16. As Jonathan White (2019) notes, emergency governance has also become central to the EU.
17. On the notion of a Great Acceleration, see McNeill and Engelke (2014).
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